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UNION INITIATED OBSTACLES THAT LIMIT DISCRE
TIONARY POWER OF MIDLEVEL MANAGERS OF THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
By Daniel Daugherty
School of Public Affairs and Administration
daniel.daugherty@wmich.edu
The purpose of this paper is to identify and examine union initiated obstacles that
Social Security Administration (SSA) midlevel managers face in using discretionary power.
Managers should be aware of the bounds in which they operate in order to adequately negoti
ate decisions, which ultimately seek to serve public needs and promote workplace democracy.
In examining the limitations of discretionary power I emphasize the importance of contractual
restrictions by focusing on the elements of collective bargaining and grievance resolution. The
intent of contractual obligations is to promote participative leadership and equality. However
when management is stripped of certain discretionary powers strong disincentives result, en
couraging laissezfaire leadership. Awareness of hurtles that contractual restrictions and corre
sponding historic adjudicative actions will enable managers to alter their leadership style and
approach, while resisting the temptation to resort to laissezfaire leadership.
Leadership
The definition of leadership is debatable among practitioners and scholars, and man
agers and the managed. Bass indicates that that the search for one true meaning of leadership
is fruitless (2008). Rather, the definition stems from the interpretation of the observer in the
context of the situation (Bass, 2008). Regardless of one’s perspective of leadership, few would
argue that discretionary powers are an unnecessary element of leadership.
Managerial Discretion
Midlevel managers of the SSA who interact directly with frontline workers exercise
discretion when they experience, think, judge, and then act (Arendt, 2003) (Weber, 1946).
These managers must have discretionary limits to avoid possible abuses of the system, such as
failing to adhere to the letter and intent of the law (Hibbeln and Shumavon, 1986), exercising
arbitrariness, or allowing and/or promoting inequality (Davis, 1969). Conversely, managers
must be allowed the flexibility to properly implement policies in an engrossed world of lan
guage confliction and political, supervisorial, peer, public, and employee pressure (Hibbeln
and Shumavon, 1986). Certainly a reasonable balance must be sought between absolute dis
cretionary power and rules that enforce discretionary limitations.
In his 1969 book, administrative law scholar Kenneth Davis indicated that discretion
ary power should be monitored and controlled through administrative and judicial measures
(1969). It is the administrators themselves, involved with the details of vague legislative poli
cies, who should make the rules governing administrative procedures (Davis, 1969). The act
of distributing this power to frontline workers is certainly instrumental in that workers are
given a sense of ownership (Bass, 2008).
Similar to managers, frontline workers need appropriate levels of discretion in order
to effectively complete tasks and successfully develop leadership skills (Lipsky, 1980). The
manager must empower employees with the necessary tools that will enable them to meet
management goals, while preserving agency quality, service, and excellence (Bass, 2008).
There is a balance that must be met between management and employee discretion. By allow
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ing greater employee discretion the manager must freely, or through coercion, relinquish dis
cretionary power. This loss of power often results in a reduction in the manager’s sense of
achievement and recognition (Bass, 2008).
SSA Manager Discretion
As with most large public organizations, the SSA has policies which have evolved
toward more narrowed definitions and implementations, reductions in discretionary powers of
managers and workers, and subjugations of management and workers toward more defined
bounds in which they must work (Social Security Administration, 2011). Frontline worker
membership in the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), the primary un
ionized representative body of voluntary nonmanagement SSA personnel, has historically
been instrumental in securing decision making power, resolving passed losses of employee
discretionary power. Unfortunately, in this swing of the pendulum, midlevel management has
experienced further limitations to discretionary power to the extent that the overarching views
of both management and employees are a mere semblance of previously existent leadership .
And while the manager’s further development of personal leadership skills has declined, the
importance on a narrowed focus of technocratic skills and parallel leadership has increased
significantly. As a result, managers possessing poor negotiation skills with their union repre
sentative counterparts often resort to laissezfaire leadership, becoming managers who “bury
themselves in paperwork and stay away from employees” (Bass, 2008).
AFGE/SSA Contractual Overview
Union representatives that managers must negotiate with are represented by the AF
GE. The AFGE is comprised of 600,000 federal and D.C. government workers, with only 15%
of these workers located in the D.C. area, and 1,100 Locals represented primarily by employ
ees of the Department of Defense, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Social Security
Administration (2011). A contract between the AFGE and the SSA stipulates the bounds in
which management conduct activities (SSA and AFGE, 2005). Similar to the German system
of unionization, managers are not members of the union (Dewitt, 1980) (SSA and AFGE,
2005). This is due to the fear that possible erosion of worker bargaining authority might ensue
(Dewitt, 1980). Among many contractual obligations that management must adhere to, collec
tive bargaining and grievance settlement are midlevel manager’s top priorities in the decision
making process.
Collective bargaining has the advantage of promoting participative, rather than di
rective, leadership. In the 1920s the industrial union’s collective bargaining agreement started
to be used in conjunction with Frederick Taylor’s scientific management principles (Fry,
1998). Applying Taylor’s framework, ideally decisions which involve employee fairness and
equality would be decided collectively between the representative union member and the SSA
manager without compromising agency efficiency or effectiveness. In practice Taylor’s princi
ples take a back seat to union interests. Although Taylor’s principles may seem a bit antiquat
ed today, the basic premise of the search for maximum productivity still remains essential in
the private and public sectors. Union interests, however, do not seek productive efficiencies.
Rather, they seek increased member involvement and bargaining leverage. Since unions only
seek contraction, agendas that attempt to scale back union power or member base meet fierce
union opposition.
In terms of AFGE members, the AFGE does accomplish the primary mission, “to
improve the professional and personal lives of …members and to improve government ser
vices” (AFGE, 2006). This accomplishment is not without costs. The Federal Times reported
in June of 2011 that a ban of official union activities during working hours was being sought
by republicans due to an Office of Personnel Management report that indicated an estimated
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$129 million was spent for 3 million hours of union activities in 2009 (Losey, 2011). The una
vailability of workers due to union activities limits resources available to midlevel managers
at a time when budget reductions due to the looming recession are ever present. Managers
cannot achieve optimal performance through their staff if they do not have the ability to exert
control over others through available resources (Henderson and Martin, 2001).
Backing union officials’ defense of SSA expenditures for union activities was Demo
cratic Representative Stephen Lynch (Losey, 2011). He indicated that this time is spent toward
“resolving workplace disputes, improving workplace safety and other working conditions,
enforcing protections against discrimination, negotiating telework agreements, or creating fair
promotion procedures” (Losey, 2011). The AFGE president, John Gage, furthered the agree
ment by suggesting that “eliminating official time would effectively spell the end of collective
bargaining in the federal government” (Losey, 2011). This “all or nothing” approach is fairly
common in negotiation procedures, yet is still an effective scare tactic. The result of a failure
to change is a forced limitation on the ability for midlevel managers to use manpower to
wards their goals, thus suppressing the element of action in exercising discretion (Arendt,
2003) (Weber, 1946).
Contract Analysis
Developing midlevel manager’s leadership growth requires giving them the neces
sary resources that allow discretionary power (Maxwell, 1993). By discouraging personal
growth midlevel managers are demotivated from achieving valid successes (Maxwell, 1993).
In examining discretion of midlevel managers the Management Rights section of the most
recent binding contract between the SSA and AFGE must be observed (SSA and AFGE,
2005):
Section 1. Statutory Rights
A.
Subject to subsection (B) of this section, nothing in this Agreement shall affect the
authority of any management official of any agency
1.
to determine the mission, budget, organization, number of employees and
internal security practices of the agency; and
2.
in accordance with applicable laws
a.
to hire, assign, direct, layoff and retain employees in the
agency or to suspend, remove, reduce in grade or pay, or take other discipli
nary action against such employees;
b.
to assign work, to make determinations with respect to
contracting out, and to determine the personnel by which agency operations
shall be conducted;
c.
with respect to filling positions, to make selections for
appointments from
(1) among properly ranked and certified candidates for promotion;
or
(2) any other appropriate source; and
d.
to take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out the
agency mission during
emergencies.
B.
Nothing in this section shall preclude any agency and any labor organization from
negotiating
1.
at the election of the agency, on the numbers, types and grades of employees
or positions assigned to any organizational subdivision, work project, or tour
of duty, or on the technology, methods and means of performing work;
2.
procedures which management officials of the agency will observe in exer
cising any authority under this section; or
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3.

appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected by the exercise
of any authority under this section by such management officials.

SSA managers represent the most trusted senior workers who generally begin their career as
frontline workers. Yet, they are not able to exercise their wisdom without the filter of the rep
resentatives of their subordinates. This often subjects them to be categorized as the glorified
mentor and the gatekeeper of hierarchical information. Their supervisors are in turn limited to
evaluating performance of procedural metrics, including union grievances. The manager is
forced to shift from the public preference of a customer centric organization to a customer
centric organization bound by competing union membership agendas. Collectively bounds are
incrementally narrowed through adjudicative victories and favorable legislative policy.
Through a more fragmented process union members ultimately affect policy through exploit
ing the contractual obligations of workplace grievance resolution.
The Union Grievance
The process of settling grievances with union assistance has advantages for both the
worker and the manager. The worker gets an opportunity to voice his disposition in cases
where the worker may feel intimidated or lack critical communication skills (Devonish and
Nurse, 2007). Grievance settlement also provides the employee with a method to solve con
tract violations without fear of repercussions (Devonish and Nurse, 2007). Workers also are
able to redirect management agendas and ensure that the workplace justice is equitable
(Devonish and Nurse, 2007). Management benefits from resolving disputes before work is
inhibited or ceased (Devonish and Nurse, 2007). This outcome allows for prevention of higher
turnover and the associated recruitment, selection and training costs (Devonish and Nurse,
2007).
Over involvement of union oversight can lead to negative outcomes of grievance
settlements and unnecessary suppression of management control. This limitation of discretion
ary power affords incompetent employees a barrier of protection under the umbrella of the
violated few. An AFGE attorney won a $100,000 award for punitive and compensatory dam
ages for 14 year veteran Magnolia Littles in an arbitration case in June of 2010 (Erling, 2010).
After receiving a 90 day suspension for approving a fraudulent payment, Magnolia claimed
that other employees were involved who had not received suspension, and was therefore the
victim of discrimination (Erling, 2010).
Another case that resulted in an unfavorable decision involved claims representative
Uma Ashok who filed two separate actions involving claims of discrimination and harassment
due to national origin and religion (Ashok v. Barnhart, 2003). Her first claim was filed on No
vember 19, 1992 after she discovered the words “Bloody Indian” scribed on her jacket (Ashok
v. Barnhart, 2003). Additional allegations resulted from Uma, eventually resulting in a final
court decision by the United States District Court for The Eastern District of New York on
October 30, 2003 (Ashok v. Barnhart, 2003).
The decisions and justifications of these cases are immaterial to the effect that they
have on management discretion. It is often the process itself that has the most drastic outcome
in changing management behavior. Both cases required increased expenditures by the federal
government and decreased productive management time allocations. Strictly on the basis of
preserving taxpayer dollars, one might conclude that the costs associated with legal proceed
ings outweigh the costs to reprimand or retain an incompetent employee.
These cases likely resulted in looming negative stigmas of the direct supervisors in
volved. A denial was the result of the second case, however, an 11 year period elapsed from
the time allegations were first made and the decision was granted by a U.S. district judge. This
is 11 years of possible promotions or appraisals leading to promotion in a competitive envi
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ronment in which minute differences are the basis for selection decisions. Obviously, any arbi
tration agreement accepted by a worker is a union victory at the expense of the manager’s up
ward mobility.
Managerial Response
Judicial review will affect relationship dynamics between frontline workers and
management. Since managers are often embedded in SSA organizational culture for 10 or
more years before reaching the first rung of the management ladder the tacit knowledge
gained by midlevel managers from witnessing the judicial decision making process is at a
fairly mature stage, so they tend to be well aware of and able to avoid potential pitfalls. Root
ing in this knowledge is the incentive for midlevel managers to lay low, prevent friction, and
limit decisions to those that have union support. The manager may be incentivized to practice
passive management by exception, where “the leader intervenes only if agreements are not
kept or subordinates’ standards fall below standards” (Bass, 2008, p.143). When the manager
makes a conscience decision not to intervene in failed agreements and low standards laissez
faire leadership is taking place (Bass, 2008).
The cases presented and many others that have had similar results represent union
victories, inevitably resulting in further increases of employee power and union support. Like
any organization, resources are limited. Therefore, the swift victories are preferable, serving as
advertising campaigns for the AFGE. A blatant attempt to secure membership is presented in
the AFGE’s public release of Magnolia Little’s case in which attorney Patti McGowan boasts,
"This is a first for an SSA local in arbitration, the unprecedented sums of damages awarded to
our member should serve as a wakeup call. We won't let these blatant injustices to our mem
bers stand” (Erling, 2010). In addition to securing membership, these AFGE public releases
serve to shape the minds of the workers destine for the management track.
Agencies tend to be responsive to adjudicatory and arbitration findings by reevaluat
ing and reformulating administrative values and procedures (Ludd, 1986). Max Weber con
tends that legitimate legalrational authority is upheld by administrative procedures (Fry,
1998). Subordination to authority is then directed from an “impersonal order”, not the manag
er (Fry, 1998, p. 28). And “legal authority exists only when legal order is implemented and
obeyed in the belief that it is legitimate” (Fry, 1998, p. 29). When legality of authority is di
minished by collective AFGE actions legitimacy of midlevel management decisions is simi
larly reduced.
Collective Bargaining
Midlevel management practices are also bound by the restrictions of collective bar
gaining in the the use of monetary incentives to motivate employees to act in the interest of
taxpayers. In October of 1988 the SSA piloted a budget/gain sharing program that divided
local budget savings, based the previous year’s productivity, evenly into both the Social Secu
rity Trust Fund and monetary awards to be distributed at the discretion of midlevel manage
ment (U.S. DHHS, SSA v. FLRA, AFGE). The AFGE responded by filing a grievance indi
cating that the national collective bargaining agreement had been violated, indicating the SSA
had failed to negotiate the implementation of the program (U.S. DHHS, SSA v. FLRA, AF
GE). The decision reached by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was an allow
ance for management to retain the discretion to determine the budget (U.S. DHHS, SSA v.
FLRA, AFGE). However, the “procedures and appropriate arrangements” of budget alloca
tions was ruled in favor of the AFGE (U.S. DHHS, SSA v. FLRA, AFGE, p. 1).
This case, among many, shapes management actions. According to Herbert Simon,
given a person’s limited capacities, the decision maker will respond to select stimuli, particu
larly shaped by routines, habits or routine or creative problem solving (Fry, 1998). Managers
use select “environmental stimuli” (Fry, 1998, p. 193) to exercise discretion when they experi
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ence, think, judge, and then act (Arendt, 2003) (Weber, 1946). Discretion is therefore limited
when action is restricted by dominate stimuli. Only experiences, thoughts, and judgments
which support union interests will result in viable actions; therefore, to increase efficient pat
terns of thought, the midlevel manager must realize cognitive bounds. The result is manage
ment’s “routinized and habitual responses”, while the “creative search activity” is minimized
(Fry, 1998). In order to realize creative decision making SSA midlevel managers must suc
cessfully negotiate agendas in the arena of workplace democracy.
Variables of the Magnitude of Participation
Union initiated managerial bounds do spur the environment for workplace democracy
to flourish. The magnitude of participation in the decision making process of a democratic
workplace can be measured by examining five variables: extensity, scope, mode, intensity and
quality (Mason, 1982).
First, the extensity, the proportion and absolute number, of workers who participate
in decisions in the organization has increased as management restrictions have decreased
(Mason, 1982). Although many frontline workers are not members of the AFGE, membership
is not required to participate in the fruits that the AFGE and SSA contract binds management
actions to. However, if participation were minimal the threat of work stoppages would cease
to be a threat to the SSA; therefore, contract compliance would naturally have minimal impact
on management decisions.
Second, the scope, the number and type of issues, of decisions are decided collective
ly relative to the decentralized structure of the SSA (Mason, 1982). Technology has played an
instrumental role in allowing for more decision making capabilities to be made in a shorter
time. The frequency and number of issues in the SSA can be decided by means of email and
instant messages in a relatively short time. With limited available time not devoted to direct
frontline customer service, managers are able to maximize collective buyin.
Neil Chamberlain, who was the associate professor of economics and assistant direc
tor of the Labor and Management Center at Yale University, indicates that the scope of collec
tive bargaining is often framed to explain that the area in which management discretion is
most constricted is from the continually increasing power of the union (1951). He argued that
the resulting decision is a “joint product” between management and the union, rather than a
narrowing of management discretionary authority (Chamberlain, 1951, p.152). Yet, Chamber
lain’s view stemmed from worker protection from “steel barons” and “coal kings” who sub
jected their workers to unsafe working conditions and low wages (1951, p. 156).
Third, the mode, the form of participation, often depends on the importance of the
decision being made (Mason, 1982). Face to face discussions continue to be the most accepta
ble forum to make decisions that may result in significant change and require input from all
members. Employees appreciate face to face decisions when news has a significant personal
effect and the availability of immediate feedback is necessary. Conversely, the electronic mes
saging is a useful tool for routine matters requiring no urgency.
Fourth, intensity, “the psychological involvement of individuals in the act of partici
pation”, of the decision is instrumental as a deciding factor for the outcome (Mason, 1982,
p.155). Frontline workers who do not believe that a decision will result that makes a differ
ence will often fail to adhere to the procedure being decided. Psychological involvement is
also dependent on the worker’s perceived fairness of the outcome (CohenCharash and Spec
tor, 2001).
Distributive and procedural justices heavily influence intensity in the workers inter
pretation of fairness (CohenCharash and Spector, 2001). Distributive justice is dependent on
the workers perceived distribution of the quantity and quality of work (CohenCharash and
Spector, 2001). When a worker perceives work distribution to be unfair the worker experienc
es “anger, pride, or guild” (CohenCharash and Spector, 2001, p. 280). Procedural justice is
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a perception of the fairness of the process that results are derived (CSpector, 2001). Included
in procedural justice is the way employees view the midlevel manager’s process of communi
cation (CohenCharash and Spector, 2001). Employees tend to perceived justified actions
when midlevel managers incorporate politeness, honesty, and respect in their messages
(CohenCharash and Spector, 2001).
Finally, quality, the impact in the workplace, of the decision also has a high impact
on worker involvement (Mason, 1982). Participation in the decision and management buyin
contributes to the quality of the decision and is more likely to result in worker compliance.
Decisions that often fail to be quality decisions are those that are hasty and formulated and
delivered by one person.
Taking these factors into account allows for midlevel managers to evaluate the ex
tent that workplace democracy is transpiring within their realm of control, and to attempt to
suppress or promote further worker involvement in the democratic process. While there is not
an adequate means to measure these factors, other organizations can be used as a basis for
comparison. One could logically speculate that the intensity and longevity of union involve
ment in an organization positively correlates with workplace democracy and negatively corre
lates with midlevel management discretionary power.
Conclusion
Midlevel managers need to be aware of bounds of union contract agreements and
past adjudicative actions in order to function successfully as a leader. The manager also must
be aware of the bounds manifested in collective bargaining and the consequences of worker
grievances in order to successfully negotiate preferred outcomes and avoid the pitfall of lais
sezfaire leadership. Finally, managers should be aware of the benefits of workplace democra
cy and the elements needed to ensure compliance.
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